



# Schizoanalysis, Marginalism, Fourierism

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## **Schizoanalysis, Marginalism, Fourierism (on two additional resources for un- derstanding the economic views of Deleuze and Guattari)<sup>1</sup>**

### **Abstract**

This article analyzes how two theories, both emerging in the nineteenth century—Fourierism and marginalism—influenced the

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economic views of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. Despite the fact that explicit recourse to those theories in *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* is merely sporadic, the implicitly inherent interrelation between these ideas and a schizoanalyst view of economics turns out to be rather substantial. First, marginalism is concerned with a “logic of the (pen)ultimate,” within the framework of which a distinction between a limit and a threshold is introduced. This distinction is important for understanding how the “apparatuses of capture,” which subjugate desiring-production to the despotic, and later to the capitalist regime, function. Second, Fourier’s “gigantism,” mentioned by Deleuze and Guattari, turns out to be an anticipation of their own theory of the “desiring machine” synthesis not only as to its general intention, but also as a detailed social mechanics, built upon the engagement of “distributive passions.”

**Keywords**

economics, desire, marginalism, Fourier, distributive passions, masochism

What is the precise number of sources underlying the conceptual framework summarized in the two volumes of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (1983, 1987) and a number of accompanying texts by Deleuze and Guattari? The answer is obvious: they are many. The framework itself is performative in the sense that it does not merely describe and clarify the constitution of various desiring machines, but also is such a machine itself. Hence, we should depart from the thought that not only a certain number of doctrines act as sources to this framework, but an additional number of doctrines are also *to become* such sources—of course, in the course of undergoing a certain rebirth. This does not negate the obvious fact that the first of such sources is Karl Marx and the Marxist tradition in its various versions and guises: <sup>2</sup>

I think Félix Guattari and I have remained Marxists, in our two different ways, perhaps, but both of us. You see, we think any political philosophy must turn on the analysis of capitalism and the ways it has developed. What we find most interesting in Marx is his analysis of capitalism as an

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<sup>2</sup> So, for instance, economists such as Suzanne de Brunoff and Bernard Schmitt have played an important role in shaping how Deleuze and Guattari understand the logic that monetary relations follow in their function (see Kerslake 2015).

immanent system that's constantly overcoming its own limitations, and then coming up against them once more in a broader form, because its fundamental limit is Capital itself. (Deleuze 1995: 171)

This confession is important. Slavoj Žižek has at one point reproached French (or “French-oriented”) “political post-Marxists” (a line from Étienne Balibar through Jacques Rancière and Alain Badiou to Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe) for drawing an unequivocal opposition between politics and economics as the spheres of ontological authenticity and inauthenticity respectively, while it would have been much more valid to “restore to the ‘economic’ domain the dignity of Truth, the potential for Events” (Žižek 2006: 328). Deleuze and Guattari’s project (also criticized by Žižek) cannot be accused of undervaluing economics as a substantial mode of being. So, while, for instance Hannah Arendt (1998: 29) thought that the expression “political economy” would sound absurd to the ancient Greek ear, for Deleuze and Guattari, politics and economics are obviously identical in nature (both have to do with the activity of desiring machines), although this does not at all mean that there is no difference between them at the level of form. In other words, politics and economics are two equally primary inherent attributes of the social substance, such that its essence is fully expressed in each of them, albeit in a specific way. The way in which the expression of one or another event is distributed between political and economic dimensions depends on the concrete situation (formation, assemblage)—thus, for instance, money and labor, language and right, as well as power and violence in a despotic assemblage will carry a qualitatively different semantic charge from that in a capitalistic assemblage. Where Arendt sees history as a univocal regression of politics to be a result of an unprecedented expansion of the economic sphere in the age of the new capitalism, Deleuze and Guattari point to two initial overarching poles of history: the pole of the despotic government, subjugating all processes (or “flows”) to the viewpoint of intraconsistency, and the pole of the town as a viewpoint of transconsistency (“the melodic lines of the towns and the harmonic cross sections of the States” [Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 432–37])—adding, then, that besides those two poles there is also a nomadic “war machine” (Ibid.), which enters into unions with towns and states, such that these unions have the character of mutual problematization (see *ibid.*). And if the open stage, on which the true political actor had shown himself, is captured by the closed space of the production and reproduction of “naked life,” and the artistic act is reduced to a process of labor (Arendt’s pessimistic point of view), this means that labor and society also change, that economics becomes political as a result of a transformation in both spheres (the “transversal optimism” of Deleuze and Guattari). Thus, any process is fulfilled only through finding its expression within the frame of

the political dimension, as well as the economical. This is true regarding all the substantial aspects of life: art, science, sexuality, and so on— aspects in which many elements explicitly or implicitly resonate with what takes place in politics and economics, yet without any of the attributes determining the other “in the end.” Thus ensues the following rule of the method: to lay bare those points, those moments, at which event and transformation, registered within the frame of one of the attributes, are to find correspondence or resonance in that which occurs within the frame of the other:

no models are specific to one discipline or one field of knowledge. What interests me is resonances, given each field with its own rhythms and history, and the dislocation between developments and transformations in different fields. At a particular point philosophy, for example, transformed the relations between motion and time; cinema may have been doing the same thing, but in a different context, along different lines. So there's a resonance between decisive events in the histories of the two fields, although the events are very dissimilar. (Deleuze 1995: 54)

Thus Deleuze testifies to his—and Guattari's—adherence to Marxism. It is obvious that this Marxism is modified, it undergoes many surgical interventions when needed, supplemented by other traditions, for instance, by cultural anthropology (also significantly modified: the view of Marcel Moss is substituted by that of Nietzsche).<sup>3</sup> I, however, am inclined to proceed here by distancing myself from the figure of Marx and the Marxist line, and also from other obvious sources of Deleuze and Guattari's thought in its politico-economical aspect to focus instead on those sources, the role of which is somewhat problematic—at least because they are only very rarely mentioned in the Deleuze-Guattari corpus. I mean here, first, the ideas of Charles Fourier, and second, those of William Stanley Jevons, an economist whose position is often associated with the so-called marginal revolution. Fourier anticipates Marx, while the marginalists strive to undermine and refute him.<sup>4</sup>

The aim of this article is not only to discover and evaluate the hidden influence of Fourierism and marginalism on schizoanalysis, but also to see how they are *produced* as sources (posited as preconditions) by schizoanalysis itself, thus opening possibilities of modification and infec-

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<sup>3</sup> A detailed analysis of how *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* uses the conceptual elements of cultural anthropology can be seen in Janvier (2012).

<sup>4</sup> Böhm-Bawerk's marginalist critique of Marx's teachings (Böhm-Bawerk, 1949) still serves as a prototype to all charges of unfoundedness, raised against these teachings.

tion. We will begin with what above was designated as “second”: Jevons and marginalism.

## 1. Marginalism, or the Logic of the (Pen)Ultimate

The thirteenth chapter of *A Thousand Plateaus* (1987), “7000 B.C. Apparatus of Capture,” is one of the key texts to understanding the economic aspects of Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptual framework. It is, in some sense, an archaeological addendum to the preceding “Treatise on Nomadology,” and its central topic is the formation of a despotic state as an organization, capable of recoding forms of life contemporary to it, rather than antecedent ones. “It is not the State that presupposes a mode of production; quite the opposite, it is the State that makes production a ‘mode’” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 429). The State is, in its essence, an apparatus of capture of always already present production processes synchronous with it, such that the method of realization of these processes is to be subject to a peculiar transformation. It is important to keep in mind here that, as Deleuze and Guattari constantly show, this apparently purely external intrusion is always matched by some kind of internal element, as if the transcendent power has, from the very beginning, had its immanent representative—summoning, anticipating its arrival:

But before appearing, the State already acts in the form of the convergent or centripetal wave of the hunter-gatherers, a wave that cancels itself out precisely at the point of convergence marking the inversion of signs or the appearance of the State (hence the functional and intrinsic instability of these primitive societies). (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 431)

It is obvious that the crucial theorem, stating that the most horrendous repression is to be understood as the desirable, can be demonstrated only thus.

It is here, rather unexpectedly, that the subject of marginalism comes up. Or rather, Deleuze and Guattari bring up a *modified* marginalism straight away, one whose interest turns to reside “not in its economic theory, which is extremely weak, but in a logical power that makes Jevons, for example, a kind of Lewis Carroll of economics” (Ibid: 437). This “logical power” is then used to analyze the process of exchange, which would do without reference to such concepts as stock, labor, and commodity, insofar as these concepts already presuppose the presence of the form of the State.<sup>5</sup> In other words, one has to express the “primordial” moment (and

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<sup>5</sup> Hence, commodity is not just an exchanged thing, but a thing that enters

element) of economic life, that is, that form of desiring-production, which in its immanent development still only moves toward the inversion point of its signs—a point, guaranteeing connection to the regime of imperial (despotic) signification.

Here we must remember that the fundamental law of economics according to Jevons himself starts from the presupposition that labor, being a means to satisfy needs and, hence, directed toward providing pleasure, is in itself related to suffering, to a burden. Both pleasure derived from the product and suffering, derived from the process, can be set mathematically, in the form of definite functions—while the function of utility, or pleasure, will have the shape of gradual decline (as a function of the need being gradually satisfied), while the function of the burden of labor, on the contrary, will be shaped as an increase, which is related to the intensity or duration of labor:

Thus, labor will be exerted both in intensity and duration until a further increment will be more painful than the increment of produce thereby obtained is pleasurable. Here labor will stop, but up to this point it will always be accompanied by an excess of pleasure. It is obvious that the final point of labor will depend upon the final ratio of utility of the object produced. (Jevons 1866)

It is this “ultimate relation” that is to determine the value of the result—that value which will regulate exchange relations between people (such that every single one of them, according to this model acts as if he has incessantly entered an exchange relation with himself, “exchanging” his free time for working time until the pleasure, caused by labor, is equalized with the suffering caused by its burden). It is interesting to see that the fact that Jevons uses the concepts of labor and price apparently does not perturb Deleuze and Guattari, as if it would have been sufficient to talk merely about “desirability as an assemblage component” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 439). This is how they have reformulated the marginalist principle (supposing that it is an adequate description of people’s behavior in primitive societies):

What is the collective evaluation of the objects based on? It is based on the idea of the last objects received, or rather receivable, on each side. By “last” or “marginal” we must understand not the most recent, nor the final, but rather the penultimate, the next to the last, in other words, the last one before the apparent exchange loses its appeal for the exchangers,

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exchange only once it relies on the element of price, an “abstract machine,” acting as the condition of possibility of a universal comparison of all produced objects; labor is the result of deterritorialization of a particular activity, etc.

or forces them to modify their respective assemblages, to enter another assemblage. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 437)

So, what does the modification of marginalism, initially announced by Deleuze and Guattari consist in? Perhaps it consists in the fact that the formulated principle does not rely on a sequential procedure of comparison between the values of separate entities in that store of goods, the total quantity of which is to be determined: the penultimate entity sets the boundary of an idea of that series of objects, the possession of which is of interest to the subject of the group and has some meaning for them. Deleuze and Guattari do not, however, discuss the fact that the (pen)ultimate of the “marginal” has a lower value than that which precedes it. It is more important to them, rather, that the (pen)ultimate plays a role of the distinguishing element, or, as they say, sets a conceptual difference “between the ‘limit’ and the ‘threshold’: the limit designates the penultimate marking a necessary rebeginning, and the threshold the ultimate marking an inevitable change” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 438); “[t]he evaluation of the last is the collective enunciation to which the entire series of objects corresponds; in other words, it is an assemblage cycle or operation period” (Ibid.: 439). Thus, the quantitative parameters of any activity, undertaken by “primitive groups,” are based on the anticipation of a threshold value, which sets the horizon of radical qualitative (or substantial) transformation of the character of this activity—we understand who lies “beyond the threshold”—no one but the “effective manager,” “chief storekeeper,” always already ready to implement a capture of the corresponding “territory,” and do it on the basis of the territory’s own immanent logic at that. Moreover, this kind of “primitive economics” is also embodied in contemporary daily life, which can be illustrated through the example of the alcoholic, motivated by the idea of the “last glass”:

The alcoholic makes a subjective evaluation of how much he or she can tolerate. What can be tolerated is precisely the limit at which, as the alcoholic sees it, he or she will be able to start over again (after a rest, a pause...). But beyond that limit there lies a threshold that would cause the alcoholic to change assemblage: it would change either the nature of the drinks or the customary places and hours of the drinking. Or worse yet, the alcoholic would enter a suicidal assemblage, or a medical, hospital assemblage, etc. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 438)

Two other examples from daily life Deleuze and Guattari give are that of a domestic squabble and a love affair. Just like alcoholism, they have a serial nature, based on the inner threshold that allows for the assemblage data to be resumed, and having an outer threshold, which

necessarily presupposes their change. In all these cases, the “new assemblages” can be, respectively, medical help for the alcoholic, divorce for the married couple, work for the lovers, in other words: hospital, court, factory... The last glass, the last word, the last love—or rather, the (pen) ultimate ones—act, in this modified version of marginalism, not as the operators of calculating and maximizing utility, but rather as signals of danger, resources of collective refusal, with the help of which subjects strive to maintain loyal to the “idea” of their way of life.<sup>6</sup> Thus, it is not a question of assemblages in general, but that of specific kind of assemblage—those which, in *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* are called “territorial” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 323–27). Each alcoholic, evidently, has his own “ground”: a series of habitual routes, rituals, meetings, and events, which he goes through every day, a “refrain” of sorts. It is also evident that in the context of such an assemblage, it hardly makes sense to say that the glass with which the drinking subject’s daily series ends is evaluated by him as “the least valuable” in comparison to those drunk before it. The idea of the number of glasses drunk itself rather corresponds to a certain quality or sense of the entire series (which is why it is necessary to refine the above expressions by Deleuze and Guattari: to “change either the nature of the drinks or the customary places and hours of the drinking” and to “enter a suicidal assemblage, or a medical, hospital assemblage” are to be compared not according to the principle of “better or worse,” but distinguished from each other as a continuous variation within an initial territorial assemblage and a radical transformation of this assemblage’s very nature).

Deleuze and Guattari’s modification of marginalism can be compared to how Russian Marxist Nikolai Ziber criticized the marginalist theory of value (albeit not as presented by Jevons, but by Léon Walras). The principle of diminishing marginal utility, declared a universal law of economics is, in reality, only applicable within the context of a hypothetical emergency: for instance, that of a traveler with a limited supply of water in the desert, or any other instance of a “gradual extinction of the organism.” In daily reality, however, all the elements constitutive of one’s riches would most probably have the same meaning, so that every knick-knack at home will be just as valuable “subjectively” as “objectively” valuable things (see Ziber 1871: 30–31). The position Giorgio Agamben (2017) formulates is even more accurately analogous to the idea which sets the meaning of the initial territorial assemblage. Agamben declares this position to be the free development of a moment of thought initially put forth by Deleuze

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<sup>6</sup> At another point, discussing experimenting with drugs, Deleuze and Guattari point to the threshold danger of the humiliating dependence on the hit and the dealer (Deleuze 2007: 153); similarly, the “war machine” is always threatened by a fascist suicidal assemblage. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 466–67).



himself, namely, that of him understanding any creative act as an act of resistance—if real art resists anything at all, then it resists full actualization of that potency, which, itself, uniquely constitutes the essence of creation: “Contrary to a common equivocation, mastery is not formal perfection but quite the opposite: it is the preservation of potentiality in the act, the salvation of imperfection in a perfect form” (Agamben 2017: 42). As an example, Agamben gives the paintings of late Titian (namely, the “Annunciation” from the San Salvador church in Venice), to which the following lines by Dante are very apt: “the artist/who for the habit of art has a hand that trembles” (Ibid.: 42–46). It can be claimed that each brushstroke on this painting indeed plays the role of the “penultimate,” that is, the role of that threshold, after which possibility would be completely actualized and the idea, consequently, exhausted, would give space to a purely formal perfection—necessitating a transition to an assemblage of some other kind (the imperative of such a “perfection” itself would express the principle of this new assemblage).<sup>7</sup>

Now to return to the marginalism of the marginalists themselves. As is well-known, their theory has two fundamental principles—the so-called Gossen’s laws, the first of which determines the diminishing utility a certain good has as a function of the need for the good being sated, and the second being the principle of the effective distribution of resources between various goods, consisting in the fact that the transition from consuming good A to consuming good B will take place if the utility of the last added instances of these goods will be equal (in the case of Jevons, this would mean that the subject will stop working if the pleasure derived from the result of yet another effort will become equal to the pleasure of refusing it). Against this backdrop, the peculiarity of that modification of marginalism, which is presented in *A Thousand Plateaus*, becomes all the more clear: no emphasis is placed on the *initial* need to distribute some limited store of means between various “ideas,” and the subjects themselves are rather loyal to their idea as to a kind of habitual way of life—but, paradoxically, they at the same time, as if anticipating the danger of changing assemblage, *unconsciously desire* deterritorialization and recoding, because the (pen)ultimate is what holds the current assemblage together, but itself within it acts as the “most deterritorialized component” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 336). In other words, Gossen’s laws describe how the contents of the “consumer basket” change: if we are

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<sup>7</sup> These examples make it obvious that at stake here is not a “return” to some lost “nature” (so, in the case of Agamben, “salvation of imperfection” is only possible on the basis of profanation operation as a response to the operation of sacralization, or the sovereign exclusion): the territorial and the despotic assemblages implicate one another, and their implementation in a pure, separate manner is always a fantasy, perverse or paranoid, while the meaning working “schizoanalytically” through them consists in pointing to the possibility of motion is a certain “inter-zone.”

given alcoholics, then they can change their drinks, bars, drinking buddies—just as lovers can change their positions, rituals and pastimes, while remaining nevertheless alcoholics and lovers, and not becoming someone radically other. On the other hand, if the subject is choosing between alcohol, love, and something else, then this simply means that we are simply given another kind of identity—for instance, one fixated on the idea of health, self-control, or diversity in pastimes and lifestyles. These laws, however, do not explain a qualitative or substantive change in the subject's stance. That which the marginalists themselves presuppose as a present rationality of the subject a priori (Gossen's laws as transcendental principles of pure economic reason), Deleuze and Guattari describe as resulting from the action of *apparatuses of capture*, located simultaneously outside and inside:

The apparent objective movement of inscription has not suppressed the real movement of nomadism. But a pure nomad does not exist; there is always and already an encampment where it is a matter of stocking—however little—and where it is a matter of inscribing and allocating, of marrying, and of feeding oneself. [...] In short, as we shall see elsewhere, there is always a pervert who succeeds the paranoiac or accompanies him—sometimes the same man in two situations: the bush paranoiac and the village pervert. (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 148)

Thus, it is not that the unity of “rational” subjectivity is superimposed on various empirical series, but rather that the difference between specific regimes and forms of existence itself plays the role of the transcendental condition of these regimes' and forms' functioning. The activity of the apparatuses of capture produces, as it ever occurs in Deleuze and Guattari's system, that which at the same time itself acts as the precondition of production. In this case, we mean the phenomenon of the *stock*—it is precisely what determines the threshold of the new assemblage, having been produced as the cause of the new mode of production:

The threshold comes “after” the limit, “after” the last receivable objects: it marks the moment when the apparent exchange is no longer of interest. We believe that it is precisely at this moment that stockpiling begins; beforehand, there may be exchange granaries, granaries specifically for exchange purposes, but there is no stock in the strict sense. Exchange does not assume a preexistent stock, it assumes only a certain “elasticity.” Stockpiling begins only once exchange has lost its interest, its desirability for both parties. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 440)

Stock is a form of economics, corresponding to the State as political form; they are mutually determinant. It is precisely the stock that, most obviously, exemplifies the sense of State as a “phenomenon of intraconsistency” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 433), precisely the stock that is the condition of possibility to compare the productivity of various plots of land, which hence leads to the rise of land income (or: stock and State are two poles of desire—the perverse and the paranoid respectively—infatuated with a meta-assemblage of sorts, subjugating the physics of processes to the metaphysics of the transcendent entity). Thus, a precise quantitative evaluation of the last element of the series is based less of the immanent idea of the series itself, and more on the background of the existence of the stock, which forces activity outside the limits of its idea, and which in turn is expressed by Gossen’s second law: for it is in the context of a medical assemblage that the “last glass” will be evaluated strictly synchronously, corresponding to the alternative series of moments belonging to a life “free of addiction”; it is precisely in the context of a “work assemblage” that various love affairs will begin to be compared as to their maximal utility for artistic creativity,<sup>8</sup> and it is precisely in the context of a court assemblage that every moment of the squabble will be correlated with the necessity of passing a sentence, and so on. Where the marginalists themselves obviously assumed a continuous transition between gradual satisfaction of some necessity (Gossen’s first law) and maximizing general utility as the rational goal of distributing limited resources between the satisfaction of various needs (Gossen’s second law) to be necessary, Deleuze and Guattari introduce the idea of a qualitative difference between two types of assemblage, each presupposing the other without intermixing (just as nomadic movement incessantly affects the settled and the settled incessantly affix the nomads). The (pen)ultimate element, embodying the distinction between limit and threshold and hence realizing desire, is what produces these assemblages—apparently analogous to how the event of sense in *Logic of Sense* presupposes the functioning of a paradoxical element, allowing to elicit resonance between various series of actions (this is why, it seems, Jevons is compared to Carroll). This is best demonstrated in how Deleuze and Guattari understand the category of labor, which signifies the result of recoding activity as a result of its “capture”:

Labor and surplus labor are strictly the same thing; the first term is applied to the quantitative comparison of activities, the second to the monopolistic appropriation of labor by the entrepreneur (and no longer

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<sup>8</sup> To be precise: in the example of love assemblage, Deleuze and Guattari were referring specifically to “Proust’s problem,” consisting in exchanging this assemblage for an artistic one.

the landowner). As we have seen, even when they are distinct and separate, there is no labor that is not predicated on surplus labor. Surplus labor is not that which exceeds labor; on the contrary, labor is that which is subtracted from surplus labor and presupposes it. It is only in this context that one may speak of labor value, and of an evaluation bearing on the quantity of social labor, whereas primitive groups were under a regime of free action or activity in continuous variation. Since it depends on surplus labor and surplus value, entrepreneurial profit is just as much an apparatus of capture as proprietary rent: not only does surplus labor capture labor, and landownership the earth, but labor and surplus labor are the apparatus of capture of activity, just as the comparison of lands and the appropriation of land are the apparatus of capture of the territory. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 442)

This is the economic content of the difference between two types of assemblage—primitive-territorial and barbaric-despotic: it is precisely the latter that presupposes a system of sublime recoding of flows—a decoding that acts in the form of a comparison between marginal productivities of various plots of land, forms of activity, and so on. (Analogously, we can conclude that from the point of view of someone “free from addiction,” everyone who continues to drink is to be compared as to how close they are to a threshold, separating them from a “higher freedom,” which is, however, incessantly subjected to the action of various elements, slipping away from its grasp: What amount can you allow yourself to consume without slipping into alcoholism? Or, what transpires in the free cities at the borders of the Empire?<sup>9</sup>)

And yet, it cannot be said that it is impossible to pose, within an economic theory framed around the postulates of marginalism, the problem of a qualitative change of assemblages in which the “rational individual” or homo *oeconomicus* takes part. Let us look at the so-called Friedman-Savage case, described and interpreted in a well-known article “Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk” (Friedman and Savage 1948). This case presents formal features that are determined by empirical evidence—it turns out that the revenue utility curve, which, according to Gossen’s first law, must reflect its diminishing character, behaves, in a certain segment, in the completely opposite fashion, that is, as if starting from a certain threshold magnitude, the subjective evaluation of additional increase in already existing revenue is higher than the evaluation of identical previous increases. The authors suggest an

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<sup>9</sup> Remember Mr. Arkadin from the eponymous film by Orson Welles, attempting to capture as his own possession everything, including the mystery of “primitive accumulation” and hence erase from memory the root of one’s origin, realizing the fantasm of a fully self-identical subject—and his antagonist van Stratten, slipping from the power of his boss and hence dooming him to perish. See Pogrebnyak (2018: 53–74).

interpretation of the peculiar behavior of the utility function, which proposes to

regard the two convex segments as corresponding to qualitatively different socioeconomic levels, and the concave segment to the transition between the two levels. On this interpretation, increases in income that raise the relative position of the consumer unit in its own class but do not shift the unit out of its class yield diminishing marginal utility, while increases that shift it into a new class, that give it a new social and economic status, yield increasing marginal utility. (Friedman and Savage 1948: 298–99, own emphasis added)

It is important that although the border of these classes or categories can be expressed objectively, in the form of a specific revenue sum (this sum would be the quantitative equivalent of the “immanent idea” of a certain assemblage), the intention itself of moving from class to class is not given with necessity—the subject must be “captured” by the transcendent idea that would turn its preceding immanent idea into a stepping stone, and that which was a limit will begin to be perceived as a threshold that needs to be crossed. Friedman and Savage themselves specify that not every single consumer unit will have a curve configured like the one they derived on the basis of analyzing cumulative data: “Some may be inveterate gamblers; others, inveterately cautious. It is enough that many consumer units have such a utility curve” (Ibid.: 299). In the historical context, Max Weber’s description of “traditionalism” as a way of thought points at the, so to speak, primal scene of this process (of “rational rebirth” and resistance to it). The essence of traditionalism according to Weber consists in people’s reluctance to earn more than what they need to maintain their habitual way of life:

Wherever modern capitalism has begun its work of increasing the productivity of human labour by increasing its intensity, it has encountered the immensely stubborn resistance of this leading trait of pre-capitalistic labour. And today it encounters it the more, the more backward (from a capitalistic point of view) the labouring forces are with which it has to deal. (Weber 1992: 24)

Productivity is not analytically contained in labor as its immanent quality; it is instead synthetically attached to it.<sup>10</sup> It is precisely because

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<sup>10</sup> According to Nick Land, productivity that is not an internal property or quality of labor “indexes the dehumanization of cyborg labour-power” (2012: 434). Thus, the Despot (State) and Oedipus (Family, Oikos) attempt to subjugate the flows to the form-human at the level of the secondary process, although at the level of the primary

of this that the leitmotif of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* is the claim that although capitalism historically appears from a contingent meeting between the decoded flows of labor and money—flows escaping the despotic code (hence the role of the towns in the development of capitalism)—nevertheless, at the level of its form it remains tied to the structure of the barbaric-despotic machine (analogous to how the psychoanalytical Oedipus is related to the mythological): “Finally, it was through the State-form and not the town-form that capitalism triumphed; this occurred when the Western States became models of realization for an axiomatic of decoded flows, and in that way resubjugated the towns” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 434). Axiomatization is due to a proliferation of the initial despotic relation, the transformation of stock into a form of organization of an activity at any level—activity which now, determined as “rationality,” ceases to be a transcendent demand aimed at the subject, and acquires the appearance of an immanent ground of the very subject’s desire. The inner limit of this “rational form” will be Oedipal neuroses and the outer threshold will be the schizophrenic process (see Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 281–83). Here, the effect of *déjà vu* is fairly expected—we have already read about all of this in Gogol, whose “The Overcoat” (1999a) we have never really left: nothing but Petersburg frost, this signifier of the fledgling imperial-capitalist machine pulls a poor civil servant from his quotidian copying and forces him to finally “change the heading,” capturing his habitual life and placing him into a new assemblage, diachronizing this life in relation to the new overcoat as a new inner limit, beyond which there is a delirious becoming—becoming a champion of higher justice, becoming a subject of divine punishment, becoming the master of the disjunctive syllogism, issuing a challenge to an “important person.”

Hence, the “logical power of marginalism,” noted by Deleuze and Guattari, which lies in the invention of an economic axiomatic that will work with decoded flows, incessantly reterritorializing them: hospital, court, art, new overcoat—all these being individual applications of a universal *Enterprise-form*.

## 2. Fourier, or Gigantism

Continuing the Gogol association, we can venture that Poprishchin from “Diary of a Madman” (Gogol 1999b) is a direct heir to Akakii Akakievich from “The Overcoat,” although these novellas were written in a different order. And yet the specific madness of the first (the subject of which is restoring justice through the return of his overcoat) has as its

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process they serve to induce the circulation of those flows in an inhuman form.

logically necessary consequence the truly universal cosmic delirium of the second (evolving from understanding the language of animals to being obsessed with the fate of the “delicate and fragile” moon). It is not a new overcoat that is needed, but at the very least a *royal mantle*: “The mantle is all ready and sewn up. Mavra cried out when I put it on. However, I still refrain from presenting myself at court. No deputation from Spain so far” (Gogol 1999b: 163). And once again *déjà vu*—read Charles Fourier:

In a state of harmony, there will be scepters of 16 kinds or titles, forming 16 positions distinguished by as many thrones: the hereditary title, the adoptive title, the title of the favorite, the vestalate title, the title of Sibyl or of education, the title of the kinglet or of childhood, etc., etc. [...] *The mobile creations*, quite different from the reproductive ones, are for each planet a periodic operation. Satellites, lesser stars make 15 of those operations; the lunar, Saturn, Earth—make 28, since among our 36 social periods, there are 8 which do not receive any mobile creations: those are 4 in the childhood phase of the planet and 4 in its decrepitude phase. (Fourier 1973: 73, 383)<sup>11</sup>

Fourier himself is the author of the first sociophilosophical system that contains a detailed engagement with the principle of *desiring-production* in that very same sense, later discussed by Deleuze and Guattari as a real process, not presupposing as its ground some pre-existing lack (1983: 25–28). Roland Barthes compares Fourierist pleasure with the edge of a tablecloth, when it suffices to “pull the slightest futile incident, provided it concerns your happiness, and the rest of the world will follow: its organization, its limits, its values” in virtue of some “fatal induction which ties the most tenuous inflection of our desire to the broadest

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<sup>11</sup> Engels in his evaluation of Fourier demonstratively opposes the spirit of his system to the spirit of Hegelianism: “I want to put before these wise gentlemen a short chapter from Fourier, which they could take as an example. It is true that Fourier did not start out from the Hegelian theory and for this reason unfortunately could not attain knowledge of absolute truth, not even of absolute socialism. It is true that owing to this shortcoming Fourier unfortunately allowed himself to be led astray and to substitute the method of series for the absolute method and thereby arrived at such speculative constructions as the conversion of the sea into lemonade, the *couronnes boréale* and *australe*, the anti-lion, and the conjunction of the planets. But, if it has to be, I shall prefer to believe with the cheerful Fourier in all these stories rather than in the realm of the absolute spirit, where there is no lemonade at all, in the identity of Being and Nothing and the conjunction of the eternal categories. French nonsense is at least cheerful, whereas German nonsense is gloomy and profound. And then, Fourier has criticised existing social relations so sharply, with such wit and humour that one readily forgives him for his cosmological fantasies, which are also based on a brilliant world outlook” (Marx and Engels 2010: 613).

sociality” (Barthes 1989: 79–80). An economic doctrine based on such a principle turns from an economics of deficit into an economic of profusion. It cannot be said that deficit does not play a part in it; and even claiming that the deficit is overcome in the course of exchanging the array of Civilization for the array of Harmony would be to simplify Fourier’s thought. It would be more precise to say that the deficit transforms, becoming some sort of *intrigue*, derivative from profusion as if it were something real, and not an ideal, the implementation of which is constantly delayed. In any case, Fourier himself is rather chastising the stupidity of the civilized (e.g., civilized morality is mendacious, since it is the case that for a few rich individuals, many more are needed who are poor<sup>12</sup>), but precisely these invectives lend particular sharpness to the harmonists’ view on wisdom as the organizing principle of their lives, the principle of attraction due to passion (i.e., desire in its pure form).

Attraction, that is, desire, is God, according to Fourier, and hence the role of supreme steward belongs to it. Of course, “had he chosen the opposite [of attraction], it would have been easy for him to create henchmen stronger than ours—amphibian giants 100 feet tall, scaled, invulnerable and initiated into our military arts. Exiting suddenly from the depths of the seas, they would have destroyed, burned our ports, our fleets, our armies and forced the mutinous empires to renounce philosophy and submit to the divine laws of social attraction in an instant” (Fourier 1973: 308–09). But God chooses to act differently, and Fourier reveals this divine wisdom in his system. Hence, the undertakings of an experienced phalange are described as a process of sequential disinvestment of all forms of social life, characteristic for the civilized (family, politics, economics); desire must act immanently, as if it were realizing its program, working through its own fears and escaping the traps it set for itself on its own. Let us compare this to the programmatic thesis of Deleuze and Guattari: “The more the capitalist machine deterritorializes, decoding and axiomatizing flows in order to extract surplus value from them, the more its ancillary apparatuses, such as government bureaucracies and the forces of law and order, do their utmost to reterritorialize, absorbing in the process a larger and larger share of surplus value” (1983: 34–35). Capitalism, as the first formation, historically

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<sup>12</sup> In our current neoliberal world, we could reformulate it as follows: Why is it the case that for the sake of a few successful entrepreneurs, all the others have to also follow entrepreneurial principles in their action? Why does Akakii Akakievich have to cease moving horizontally, following the twist of the handwritten letter, and accommodate himself to the vertical demands of the printed digit? Deleuze and Guattari would have pointed to a difference of interest and desire: it may be that petty capitalists have not fared well in their interest—their profits are low and prospects dubious—yet they are doing well at the level of the libido, invested in the capitalist machine as such, amazing as to its function. (See Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 373–74).



built on decoded flows, is precisely what acts as a machine that incessantly starts the process of schizophrenization as its outer limit and producing the rhizome<sup>15</sup> as a form of the world's givenness, but also at the same time reproducing, as its own limit, axiomatization and neurotization as means of reacting to the produced. Would it be an exaggeration to imagine *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* as an attempt to reactivate the main positions of Fourier's framework and revive his teachings in the circumstances of late capitalism—or, as Deleuze and Guattari themselves put it, as an attempt to imagine Fourierism not as a description of a potential future, but rather as a thematization of that virtual plane—the body without organs, the plan of consistency, of intensity, which produces the actual state of affairs as an aggregate of its effects? We should not be put off by the fact that the authors of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* themselves do not at all formulate their own task in those terms—the few mentions of Fourier could be the key to understand that, which gives a measure of meaningfulness to the multitude of singular elements, which constitute their own system. In this regard we can put forth the following hypothesis: Fourier's system gives us an idea of that very plane of consistency on which all event series attain their highest intensity, overcoming various limitations that are laid upon them in one or another specific context. “But the identity of desire and labor is not a myth, it is rather the active Utopia par excellence that designates the capitalist limit to be overcome through desiring-production” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 302)—this claim from the last chapter of *Anti-Oedipus* sounds purely Marxist, with the addition of desire. But even with this addition, it transforms into Fourier's position, as he had thought production in its true form (the way it was conceived by God or nature) exclusively as desiring.

In *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Fourier's name is mentioned only a few times, but every time it is to underline a fundamental agreement with his theory. Let us look at the two most characteristic references. Already in the first chapters of *Anti-Oedipus*, the theme of utopia arises in the context of the question of desiring-production not as an imaginary, but as a real occurrence (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 367–68). The socialist utopias of the nineteenth century are here evaluated as anticipating a realistic reading, because it is proposed to understand them “not as ideal models but as group fantasies—that is, as *agents of the real productivity of desire*, making it possible to disinvest the current social field, to ‘deinstitutionalize’ it, to further the revolutionary institution of desire

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<sup>15</sup> In Fourier's system, the idea of production beyond the form, imposed upon it by civilization, is vividly revealed to him in the *science of analogy*, with a description of which *Le Nouveau Monde industriel et sociétaire* ends. Furthermore, that very same image of potato, which Deleuze and Guattari will use as a symbol of the rhizomatic form as opposed to the system of a “tree or root, which plots a point, fixes an order” appears precisely here (1987: 7).

itself” (Ibid.: 30–31, own emphasis added). In other words, if “utopia” indeed comes across as a phantasm, it does not happen within the regime of saddling desire with certain rules on behalf of the social production of some or other “goods” “through the intermediary of an ego whose fictional unity is guaranteed by the goods themselves,” but as the desiring-production of affects that, quite to the contrary, “imposes its rule on institutions whose elements are no longer anything but drives” (Ibid.: 63). The only name mentioned in conjunction with pointing to utopia understood not as an ideal model, but as “revolutionary action and passion” is that of Fourier.

A more detailed recourse to Fourier takes place in the last chapter of *Anti-Oedipus* and once again unfolds in the context of discussing the true nature of desire: “For the prime evidence points to the fact that desire does not take as its object persons or things, but the entire surroundings that it traverses, the vibrations and flows of every sort to which it is joined, introducing therein breaks and captures—an always nomadic and migrant desire, characterized first of all by its ‘gigantism’: no one has shown this more clearly than Charles Fourier” (Ibid.: 292). Desire, as Deleuze and Guattari never tire of telling us, is not bounded by the limits of individuals and families as, if its’ spread beyond those limits could appear only as a result of a desexualization, as Freud supposed; but quite to the contrary: those bodies and faces, obviously, act only as desire-blockers, as the result of its limitation and suppression. Yes, those bodies and faces are, obviously, desired, but they are desired within the field of the unconscious, which immeasurably surpasses them, without itself being something indetermined, “un-formed”—quite to the contrary, its nature is set by a formal (or modal) difference between two regimes:

Thus no matter how well grounded the love blockage is, it curiously changes its function, depending on whether it engages desire in the Oedipal impasses of the couple and the family in the service of the repressive machines, or whether on the contrary it condenses a free energy capable of fueling a revolutionary machine. (Here again, everything has already been said by Fourier, when he shows the two contrary directions of the “captivation” or the “mechanization” of the passions.) But we always make love with worlds. And our love addresses itself to this libidinal property of our lover, to either close himself off or open up to more spacious worlds, to masses and large aggregates. There is always something statistical in our loves, and something belonging to the laws of large numbers. (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 293–94)

That, according to the authors of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Fourier had already said everything, is not a purely particular moment, but the initial principle, according to which the system of schizoanalysis

itself has been built. Just as how Deleuze and Guattari demonstrate psychoanalysis's capacity to subvert the true order of desire (from being one of many possible products of desire family becomes its necessary and monopolized producer), Fourier declares the order of civilization to be "an inverted world," where the virtue of labor is treated as morally laudable, but those very same morals cut labor from their true origin of meaning (the abstraction of labor here exceeds in its scale that described by Marx), that is, of desire and its "gigantism."

Thus in *The Theory of the Four Movements* (1996), Fourier mentions a man in France, his contemporary, who eats fourteen pounds of raw meat in one sitting and hence is called a "carnivore," and then concludes that since "the Creator has everywhere had to produce inverted designs of the combined order, he has used the example of the tapeworm to represent the prodigious appetites of individuals brought up in the new order" (Ibid.: 178). Similarly, in *Le nouveau monde industriel* (1973), he argues against the view that children are little gourmands: "nothing is more false; they are not gourmands, but merely gluttons, greedy creatures. They avidly eat unripe fruit and other vile junk, had they been gourmands and connoisseurs, they would have given that course foods to the pigs. Their gluttony is a germ, which should be turned into *gourmandise*, into rational gastronomy and applied to the three other functions of taste [i.e., cuisine, conservation, cultivating]" (Ibid.: 232). Gluttony and greed (the oral and the anal phases) are regressive only in their reverse, retroactive positing on the basis of that which denies them; they are also potentially progressive on the basis of their immanent development in a society of the future, presupposing a ubiquitous enthusiasm for gastrosophy and the organization of management activities on the basis of the attraction of passions. To put it simply—gluttony and greed are "monstrous" forms of desire, in which it announces itself within the frames of a personal and family assemblage, the threshold of which it, nevertheless, is capable of crossing (it is worth remembering here that it was Fourier who consistently voiced the idea of turning away from familialism and toward radically different forms of human union, specifically that of *complete* groups, organized in series according to passions.<sup>14</sup> The virtues of future society

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<sup>14</sup> A family, as the civilized have it, is a false group, because it is limited by the number two. A true, or complete group in the new society should contain at least seven members, "because it must contain three subdivisions, called sub-groups, the middle of which should be stronger than the ones at the extremity, as it has to keep balance" (Fourier 1973: 63). Deleuze and Guattari also speak about two groups: the subjugated, centered around a preconscious interest, and subject-groups, open to unconscious desire (see Deleuze and Guattari 1985: 348–49). Furthermore, it is important that Fourier treats childhood as a neutral sex (1973: 86), which anticipates the de-oedipalization of child sexuality in Deleuze and Guattari, for instance in the second chapter of *A Thousand Plateaus* "1914—One or Several Wolves?" (1987: 26–38).

are given in the current one only as “vices” and “perversions,” for they are viewed through the prism of what is taken to be a “virtue” today—and what is precisely truly vicious and perverse).

The best example of “gigantism” in action would be the description of “little hordes” (see *ibid.*: 185–90)—that is, how, in the state of Harmony, groups of pre-teenage children (namely, two-thirds of boys and one-third of girls, who have a natural propensity for uncleanness, joined also by a certain amount of old men and women—druids and druidesses—sharing a similar passion), who will place the role of “God’s militia” (*la milice de Dieu*), that is, stand guarding industrial unity, voluntarily dedicating themselves to extremely dirty or dangerous labor, despised in the state of Civilization, such as purifying sewage water, chimney-sweeping, separating and sorting guts, catching amphibians, and so on. (Fourier describes the mode of action in these little hordes in great detail—in them, the inconstancy, curiosity, tendency to disobey fathers and mentors, so typical of children of that age, do not hinder, but facilitate their work, which begins with a parade, ringing of the bells, barking of the dogs and bellowing of the bulls—riding ponies, the hordes, under the lead of their khans and priests “frantically throw themselves at their work, which is performed like a pious deed, like an act of charity for the phalange, like a service to God and unity” (*Ibid.*)). Precisely this strictly immanent action, that is, one that is based singularly on attraction according to passions, should be opposed to that purely negative and transcendent intervention of the aforementioned “henchmen stronger than ours.”<sup>15</sup> Fourier incessantly underlines the crucial role that little hordes play in the life of a phalange, which suggests that it is in them that the principle of attraction is predominantly exemplified. If we turn to Deleuze and Guattari, we see that according to their framework, taking the anus outside the limits of the social field lies at the basis of all capitalist limitations of desire (reducing the libido to an abstract quantity, the creation of private persons and privatization of the organs, etc.): “It was the anus that offered itself as a model for privatization, at the same time as money came to express the flows’ new state of abstraction” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 143). But the little hordes’ participation in sanitary works does not actually mean the fulfillment of some sort of organic function, depreciated on moral and aesthetic grounds, not at all—working with “flows of shit” has now become an equal (if not the most valued) component of the social order. Staying

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<sup>15</sup> In this dark description, Fourier has anticipated the dystopias of the following centuries. Jean-Louis Déotte describes the insensate sensibility, “inculcated in those who serve in the special forces in those neoliberal times: “They have learned to ‘run on instinct,’ following the commands of the reptile brain: this paradoxically presupposes an almost complete anesthesia. To suspend the pre-subjective sensation and prefer objective information (hence the importance of informational equipment in the helmets of the fighters of tomorrow” (Déotte 2002: 124).

partial (because there are others), the object of the little hordes' labor is not just rehabilitated as an object of attraction or desire, the subject of which is the entire society (and, at the limit, of the cosmos), but it acquires paramount importance, hence the honors and large income that are to be granted to members of little hordes. "It may even be the case that consistency finds the totality of its conditions only on a properly cosmic plane, where all the disparate and heterogeneous elements are convoked" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 327): the actions of the little hordes are construed by Fourier in such a way so as to appear as if they were directly given in the plane of cosmic consistency, and did not occupy the lowest rank in an hierarchy based on some transcendent authority. Sewage flows, vile vermin, sorting extracted animal guts—all this is directly linked to industrial unity, the communication between groups, series, phalansteries, peoples, and so on.<sup>16</sup>

Fourier's "gigantism" has a qualitative rather than quantitative character (despite his passion for calculating those mind-boggling profits, which would be generated by founding an experimental phalange as an enterprise on a shared basis). Here we have to pay attention to that aspect, common to Fourier and Deleuze-Guattari, which the authors of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* themselves do not highlight. I have in mind here a theory of syntheses, which act as the conditions of possibility of the truly existent (natural and social reality), being at that also methods of production of this existent. Three such syntheses play a part in schizoanalysis, so that each of them presupposes two polar regimes of its usage, "molar" suppression and "molecular" liberation: connective synthesis (in the mode of univocity or, as its opposite, plurivocity), disjunctive synthesis (exclusive or, as its opposite, inclusive), conjunctive synthesis (tied to specificity or, as its opposite, free of it). What Fourier calls the system of harmony, and what Deleuze and Guattari call the system of a rhizome must be understood as generalized forms of positive dynamic unity (of society as well as of nature), produced by the above syntheses working in the "molecular" mode.

It seems that the prototype of those syntheses are the three *distributive passions* on which should be based, according to Fourier, the action of the social mechanism capable of overcoming civilization and realizing the true unity in place of the false. These passions are not only the same in number, but they also in just the same way are specifically the means of connecting capacities, being, as it were, the passions of passions. And if the *real* in *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* is understood positively and

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<sup>16</sup> The exceptional position of the little hordes also explains why it is they who are entrusted with the supreme oversight of animals: "Whoever mistreats a quadruped, bird, fish or insect, causing it pain during its service or making it suffer at the abattoir, is to be judged by the Divan of little hordes" (Fourier 1973: 183).

affirmatively, and not negatively and limitingly, the action of the three distributive passions in Fourier's system is the same: they are, as it were, the transcendental condition of connection between empirical passion, but the character of this connection manifests in the fact that thanks to it, the positing, productive capacity of passions is liberated, so that they complete and strengthen one another. Thus, the connective synthesis will correspond to a passion named "la papillonne," which in the society of the future will be tasked with realizing the principle of the brevity of sessions. (This is, of course, the root of the famous definition of communism as a society where before dinner people engage in hunting and agriculture, and after dinner—give themselves to critique of something else, whatever their hearts desire; it is important that the "distributive passions" in Fourier's system play the role of syntheses of time, and also that in their germinal form they also appear in the state of civilization: hence, the action of la papillonne manifests in the way of life of Parisian sybarites, who, throughout the day, flutter from one high society event to another). The disjunctive synthesis corresponds to the passion named "la cabaliste," the task of which consists in constant plotting and scheming, making the people in Harmony interact with each other at the level of exposing differences, making even the most compact series nonidentical to itself. (Fourier emphasizes that series based on passion should be focused on small differences, far less obvious than those between different species—these, for instance, like the differences between different individual pears of the same kind: they are what causes the biggest passionate disagreements between pear-breeders. It suffices here to remember the Freudian notion of "narcissism of small differences," which explains the mutual antipathy of peoples that historically have much in common with each other—but this negative application, Fourier would have said, only in force under the conditions of Civilization!) Finally, it is possible that the conjunctive synthesis is somewhat analogous to the passion called "la composite"—it conditions the *parceled* implementation of labor, which permits every group to concentrate on that segment of work, which is most invigorating for the members it consists of.

Fourier proposes a multitude of examples, based on the mechanism of distributive passions, to illustrate how to provide solutions for a multitude of problems, which under the state of civilization appear to be fully insoluble. Let us take the example of garlic and poetry, which can be compared to the example of the wasp and the orchid, forming a rhizome as a synthesis of two heterogeneous series (see Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 31). Let us imagine, says Fourier, parents who have a daughter, but their trouble is that this daughter has, as her most developed passion, one that is condemned within prevailing mores, namely, a passion for eating garlic. Conversely, the passion whose development is in every way encouraged, namely, that for learning grammar is, in the case of this daughter, almost

entirely lacking. Here, that which in the state of civilization is a problem in the state of harmony would appear to be good luck: of course parents want their daughter to stop eating garlic and turn herself diligently toward grammar, but her natural inclinations are not to be thwarted, but instead developed in another direction:

After having her put into a cabalistic connection at the table in the garden with lovers of garlic, present to her the Ode in Honor of the Garlic by Monsieur Marcellus: she will hasten to read it, if she is truly aroused against garlic detractors. Take advantage of this reading to initiate her superficially into lyric poetry; perhaps she will grow interested to poetry before grammar, but the one leads well to the study of another. Here societary education combines the cabalistic spirit and bizarre tendencies to awaken in the child the taste for study, and to lead her indirectly to that which she would have obstinately rebuked without the support of some stimulation by intrigue. (Fourier 1973: 240)

Is this not an example of how the synthesis of an inclusive (not the exclusive) disjunction is realized? The lover of garlic does not just enter the group series of those who share her initial passion, but also becomes intrigued by what happens in the alternative series of language lovers—the “Ode to Garlic” here plays the role of that very paradoxical element, which forces various series to resonate without lessening, at that, the difference which exists between them (as Barthes points out, Fourier’s “association” does not have a “humanist” principle as its ground: “it is not a matter of bringing together everyone who has the same mania [“co-maniacs”] so that they can be comfortable together and enchant each other by narcissistically gazing at one another; on the contrary, it is a matter of associating to combine, to contrast” [Barthes 1989: 99]). Hence the method of roofed galleries, on which the architecture of the phalanstery is based. It is the condition of possibility of the daily formation of all kinds of intrigue, that is, of implementing the cabalistic spirit into the life-sustaining activity of the series.

The connection between Paris arcades and the setup of the phalanstery is highlighted by Walter Benjamin (1969: 163); he also draws an analogy between architecture and language: “For if the sentence is the wall before the language of the original, literalness is the arcade” (Benjamin 2007: 79). Let us not forget that Fourier has dreamed of overcoming the linguistic disparity between peoples, being himself, as Barthes precisely put it, a Logothete, that is, a founder of language (Barthes 1989: 3). For instance, the significance that Fourier gives to the practice of naming is obvious—a fact that brings him closer to not only Benjamin, but also to Deleuze, who claims that “individuals find a real name for themselves, rather, only through the harshest exercise in

depersonalization, by opening themselves up to the multiplicities everywhere within them, to the intensities running through them” (Deleuze 1995: 6). It can be said that the individual here *becomes* “arcade,” and this does not mean that he loses his individuality, for, becoming an “arcade” he stays *this* “arcade,” located in some sort of singular assemblage—hence he only overcomes the unalterable fixation on the borders of “his own” exceptional personal character.<sup>17</sup> In the above example, garlic is taken beyond the limits of judgment (and moral condemnation) into the sphere of naming poetics, which refers us to the universal communicability of various series. “Any point of a rhizome can be connected to anything other, and must be” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 7); “Each plateau can be read starting anywhere and can be related to any other plateau” (Ibid.: 22)—taken in abstraction from their context, these well-known statements from the introduction to *A Thousand Plateaus* can be interpreted as contentless calls to synthesize everything with everything, which would have been absolutely correct had those statements been made from the point of view of a free-floating subject, unincorporated into the flesh of this world, and not from the point of view of someone who is always already involved into the process of universal becoming, and from whom “each” and “any” (point, plateau) are every time given at a concrete moment of time and hence present a concrete problem, which is to be solved in this or that manner (e.g., according to the formula of making patchwork quilts [Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 476–77]).

The principle of universal combinability, the connectedness of everything with everything is merely an abstract possibility, and in concrete reality it relies on singular points of attraction through passion—hence, an interest toward poetry can actually only arise for a certain reason, for instance due to a passion for garlic (this passion itself, at that, is quite possibly also set “poetically,” albeit at a different level), and the lover of garlic becomes a lover of poetry only under the condition that poetry, also, become something else. Furthermore, becoming is that which works within history and nature *against* them.<sup>18</sup> Fourier’s famous humor

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<sup>17</sup> Manuel DeLanda draws a distinction between the principle of assemblage, used by Deleuze and Guattari, to the principle of methodological individualism, accepted in microeconomics analysis: “In assemblage theory persons always exist as part of populations within which they constantly interact with one another. But more importantly, while the identity of those persons is taken for granted in microeconomics, in assemblage theory it must be shown to emerge from the interaction between subpersonal components” (DeLanda 2006: 32).

<sup>18</sup> Cf. “Every becoming is an alliance. Which does not mean, once again, that every alliance is a becoming. There is extensive, cultural, and sociopolitical alliance, and intensive, counter-natural, and cosmopolitical alliance. If the first distinguishes filiations, the second confuses species or, better yet, counter-effectuates by implicative synthesis the continuous differences that are actualized in the other direction (the way



thus manifests itself nowhere better than in the examples he gives, which demonstrate the irreducibility of one or another singular case to a particular kind of activity (try to deduce these examples from a “general principle”!)—hence in those examples he most often uses characters with proper names.<sup>19</sup>

The state of harmony and the phalanstery as its infrastructure therefore play the role of a mechanism for liberating desire, which turns out to be an immanent ground for productive activity, and not the demand of some transcendent authority. But is Fourier’s “gigantism” not the initial version of *accelerationism*, in relation to which Deleuze and Guattari act as heirs, as if Fourier applied the principle of “industrial adoption” onto them and their discourse? The term “acceleration,” according to Nick Land, describes the temporal structure of capital accumulation and hence “references the ‘roundaboutness’ founding Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk’s model of capitalization, in which saving and technicity are integrated within a single social process—diversion of resources from immediate consumption into the enhancement of productive apparatus” (Land 2014: 511). Learning grammar through garlic and poetry—is this not a roundaboutness? Or, if we talk about schizoanalysis, is the body without organs or the plan of consistency not that “immobile motor” of economics, which forces it to work in a mode of inhuman acceleration and incessant transformation—fully in correspondence with Gottfried Leibniz’s fundamental posit, according to which we are to judge the world as if it were created exclusively for us (see Leibniz 2007: 191–92)?

It is perhaps sensible to differentiate here not just between right and left, but also between axiomatic and problematic accelerationism. Here, Yoel Regev’s observations are of particular importance: he maintains that accelerationism, combined with Deleuze’s views as presented in his book on Sacher-Masoch, exemplify in an obvious manner only the sadist strategy (to be precise, the phantasm of an “absolute crime,” which must

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is not the same...) through the limiting synthesis of discontinuous speciation” (De Castro 2014: 164). The actions of some characters in J. M. Coetzee’s novels can serve as an example of the counter-historical character of becoming—those characters are immersed in the current of “big History,” but they consistently resist its “logic,” using whatever they can get their hands on at the moment—from pumpkins to dog corpses.

<sup>19</sup> “Bastien, a young man without means, has torn his most beautiful dress on a snag. On the next day a group of chambermaids, while cleaning Bastien’s room, bring this dress to the seamstresses’ workshop, run by Céliante, an opulent woman of 50, passionate for mending apparently hopeless tears—a job in which she, arguably, knows no equal. Céliante has taken a liking to Bastien, whom she meets in different groups where he excels: he takes care of Céliante’s favourite pheasants at the pheasant aviary, and of her clove-smelling carnations, in the group dedicated to this variety; she desires to meet him, and upon seeing a dress marked “Bastien,” she takes the job and executes the mending with great perfection” (Fourier 1973: 11).

overcome the limited character of each singular transgression in an entire series of crimes, each of which marks the previous one as a failure from the point of view of the idea of nature, fully liberated from the laws that limit it), but fully ignore the position of the masochist, although Deleuze does everything to demonstrate its unconditional independent significance (see Regev 2018: 145). It is not a coincidence that in his last book, *Critical and Clinical* (1998), Deleuze returns to this subject, dedicating to it a tiny, but extremely rich text entitled “Re-presentation of Masoch” (1998: 53–55). The method of interpretation stays the same: to not confuse the character of the process of production with the image of that *which* is produced—in *Masochism*, this allowed Deleuze to overcome that reduction, on which the Freudian understanding of masochism as sadism directed at oneself is based. But Masoch, says Deleuze, does not start from an understanding of suffering identical to that of Sade—he *displaces* this understanding, putting it into an exclusive relation with a contract:

But the manner in which the contract is rooted in masochism remains a mystery. It seems to have something to do with breaking the link between desire and pleasure: pleasure interrupts desire, so that the constitution of desire as process must ward off pleasure, repress it to infinity. The woman-torturer sends a delayed wave of pain of the masochist, who uses it, obviously not as a source of pleasure, but as a flow to be followed in the constitution of an uninterrupted process of desire. What becomes essential is waiting or suspense as a plenitude, as a physical and spiritual intensity. (Deleuze 1998: 53–54)

A masochist, thus, strives to realize the possibility of playing with desire, putting in question (laughing at) the imperative character of pleasure.<sup>20</sup> This attempt to counterpose the motherly (humorous) contract to

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<sup>20</sup> The character of the currently dominant formation of desire—dominant through and through, productive, and not “seductive”—has been most precisely described by Jean Baudrillard: “Ours is a culture of premature ejaculation. Increasingly all seduction, all manner of enticement—which is always a highly ritualized process—is effaced behind a naturalized sexual imperative, behind the immediate and imperative realization of desire. [...] This pressure towards liquidity, flux and the accelerated articulation of the sexual, psychic and physical body is an exact replica of that which regulates exchange value: capital must circulate, there must no longer be any fixed point, investments must be ceaselessly renewed, value must radiate without respite—this is the form of value’s present realization, and sexuality, the sexual model, is simply its mode of appearance at the level of the body” (1990: 38). But, taking into account Deleuze’s reading of masochism, accusing him of a purely “realizatory” attitude (which Baudrillard does in his programmatic article “Forget Foucault”) can and must be put in question.

the fatherly (ironic) law is very accurately shown by Rainer Werner Fassbinder in his film *I Only Want You to Love Me* (1976): its “protagonist,” a hardworking man called Peter, is ready to play the game of credit capitalism and consumerist society with their demands of rational self-exploitation in the name of enjoying a higher level of comfort and well-being, but only if he is to live as if forgetting his own debt obligations (or even believing that the bank has somehow managed to forget them)—the flowers that he incessantly gives the women in his life embody this frozen desire, leading ultimately to a catastrophic collapse of all his “economy” to the extent that some normative production is demanded of it. Of course, a sadistic father incessantly, even ultimately, returns—Fassbinder shows us how Peter constantly misidentifies people, seeing his father in others. Indeed, this is the return of the imperative to enjoy—to enjoy that you, over and over, turn to be able to transition to the next step, but only securely consolidating yourself on the previous step, “standing firmly on your feet”; in other words, it is to exist within the framework of a “despotic assemblage” of a business enterprise, where the univocally recognizable effect of pleasure stands as a preeminently effective method to control all vital processes. It is pleasure that turns every individual moment of being into an exclusive *dividual* moment—always functionally divisible into the limiting-moment and the threshold-moment, which allows the paradoxical unity of a stop (“I have achieved this!”) and a transition (“I am not stopping here!”).

Deleuze here underlines that “the true nature of sadism and of masochism is revealed not in any supposed genetic derivation but in the structural ego-superego split” (Deleuze 1991: 129): the sadistic logic of *negation* as grounded in the ideal of pure reason and the masochist logic of *suspension* as the embodiment of the ideal of pure imagination are not the transformation of some general function. This distinction manifests itself most clearly in relation to fetishism. The world of the masochist is held together by the fetish, it is the condition of possibility of the process of disavowal (*denegation*):

Disavowal should perhaps be understood as the point of departure of an operation that consists neither in negating nor even destroying, but rather in radically contesting the validity of that which is: it suspends belief in and neutralizes the given in such a way that a new horizon opens up beyond the given and in place of it. [...] The fetish is therefore not a symbol at all, but as it were a frozen, arrested, two-dimensional image, a photograph to which one returns repeatedly to exorcise the dangerous consequences of movement, the harmful discoveries that result from exploration; it represents the last point at which it was still possible to believe... (Deleuze 1991: 31)

“The last point at which it was still possible to believe” is, of course, the formula for a limit, stopping in order to not cross a certain threshold. But we cannot claim that fetish plays no role whatsoever in sadism—rather, it would be correct to claim that fetish is asymmetrically distributed between the sadist and the masochist series, being differently represented in each of them. In the case of masochism, it clearly constitutes the essence of the occurrence; in the case of sadism it is merely somewhat connected to it. If for the sadist a fetish is just the object of a hostile attitude, introduced in order to be destroyed, the masochist lacks such intention (Deleuze illustrates this through the case of the “braid-cutter,” as described by Richard von Kraft-Ebing).

Thus, we have the destruction of the fetish as a result of the meltdown of reality, effected by the transcendent Idea (sadism)—and the stubborn strengthening of the phantasm as a means to suspend, “freeze” the ideal as well as the real (see Deleuze 1991: 72). This distinction also works in the case of commodity fetishism, where things unfold as if the exchange value got incessantly “suspended,” fixed in its finite qualitative determination, reflected in the mirror of consumer value; but since capital, that is, the process of producing surplus value, is the subject of the entire process, this “mirror” is formed only to incessantly break. The position of the “masochist” in the structure of capitalist relations would have meant faith in the fact that the moment of subjugating vital matter to commodity form is what is suspended, as it is for this moment that this matter is capable of revealing in itself a multiplicity of immanent forms, incessantly fleeing from the dominance of the form of value (marvelously demonstrated in the film *Monday Morning* by Otar Ioseliani [2002]: the protagonist of the film, getting from his father a heap of banknotes from different countries, embarks on a trip, fleeing a “settled” family-factory assemblage as well as an unequivocally nomadic one, one akin to a Roma band—even when the money at some point flees him with the help of pickpockets, this does not hinder his trip).

It is possible that the “masochistic” trick of delaying pleasure is somehow related to that means of existence that, in the thought system of Deleuze and Guattari, is characteristic of minorities:

The power of the minorities is not measured by their capacity to enter and make themselves felt within the majority system, nor even to reverse the necessarily tautological criterion of the majority, but to bring to bear the force of the non-denumerable sets, however small they may be, against the denumerable sets, even if they are infinite, reversed, or changed, even they if imply new axioms or, beyond that, a new axiomatic. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 471)<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> In *Masochism: Coldness and Cruelty*, Deleuze emphasizes that for Masoch it

But this is precisely Fourier's way of thinking, the effect of his discourse: the calculation of infinite riches, produced in the form of money (and hence inscribed in the existing axiomatic of Civilization), is incessantly put in question, suspended with the help of the peculiar poetics of the incalculable—which is most precisely formulated by Barthes, who has designated Fourier's method as paragrammatic, and presenting "super-impression (in dual hearing) of two languages, that are ordinarily foreclosed to each another, the braid formed by two classes of words whose traditional hierarchy is not annulled, balanced, but—what is more subversive—disoriented: Council and System lend their nobility to tiny pastries, tiny pastries lend their futility to Anathema, a sudden contagion *deranges* the institution of language" (Barthes 1989: 93).<sup>22</sup> Fetishes, formed in every area of activity through "non-specific conjunction" ("Fourierist enumeration is always reverse conundrum: what is the difference between a horse, a cat and fertilizer? None, for the function of all three is to reabsorb inferior-grade melons" [Barthes 1989: 93]), serve as the beginning of yet another line of flight, allowing the subject to touch the process of productive activity exclusively at that point, where it keeps a *suspended* relation with this activity. In brief: we should perhaps read Fourier anew, plugging in this "masochist" impulse and enacting the following inversion: it is not the case that the principle of attraction due to passion and to the passion-based method of series is the means to an unprecedented growth of society's riches, but rather the opposite—a humorous "gigantism" of calculating future riches is the method of searching and examining, in slow motion, those passions which usually (in the state of Civilization) are treated as harmful, unproductive, senseless (an example could be the "intermediary passions" and generally everything that looks strange, for instance: "like those of people who like old chickens, the eater of horrid things (like the astronomer Jérôme Lalande, who liked to eat live spiders), the fanatics about butter, pears, bergamots, Ankles, or 'Baby Dolls'" (Barthes 1989: 77–78).<sup>23</sup> Fourier's texts are infinitely detailed "contracts," which human-

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was the minorities inhabiting the Austrian empire that were "an inexhaustible source of stories and customs" (Deleuze 1991: 38).

<sup>22</sup> Barthes here uses an example of the method to classify pies, which Fourier proposes: "44 systems of tiny pies," "ovens with pies, anathematized by the Universal council," "pies accepted by the Babylon council," etc. Fourier has a multitude of such series, and they all, in some way, subvert the institution of language or, in the terminology of Deleuze and Guattari, are "propositions of flow" and not "propositions of axioms" (1987: 471).

<sup>23</sup> Could we say that in Fourier's example with grammar and garlic, the subject flees the imperative preference of one to the other, hence sadomasochistic pleasure due to the fulfillment of a command, instead suspending both possibilities as mutually non-exclusive? Barthes emphasizes that Fourier's discourse, in contrast to that of Sade, is a discourse of "general well-being," and "if, however, in Harmony, one chances to suf-

ity has to sign with itself in order to “suspend” Civilization, with its sadist morals and lack-based economics.

Thus, it is in this structural split, the sides of which are masochism and sadism, we can see the resource for the formation of the main conceptual persona of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*: if a pervert creates “territorialities infinitely more artificial than the ones that society offers us” (the monastery or castle, where de Sade’s characters realize the movement of transgression, or the boudoir, where Masoch’s character realizes his dreams, then the schizo goes “continually wandering about, migrating here, there, and everywhere as best he can, he plunges further and further into the realm of deterritorialization, reaching the furthest limits of the decomposition of the socius on the surface of his own body without organs. It may well be that these peregrinations are the schizo’s own particular way of rediscovering the earth” [Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 35]). So: Is not “the concurrence of sadism and masochism [...] fundamentally one of analogy only; their processes and their formations [...] entirely different; [and does not] their common organ, their ‘eye’, squint [...] and should [it not] therefore make us suspicious?” (Deleuze 1991: 46). This question should be answered in the affirmative, but it should be added that this squinting eye is looking in the direction of their disjunctive synthesis and paves the path of flight.

In one of its schizoanalytical variations, Nick Land interprets the action of the “machinic unconscious” as a “[d]escendent influence [—] a consequence of ascendently emerging sophistication, a massive speed-up into apocalyptic phase-change” and names a *cyberguerilla* as the subject of this movement, “hidden in human camouflage so advanced that even one’s software was part of the disguise” (2011: 317–18). But is not the great trilogy by William Gibson—whom Land involves in the movements of his thought (Ibid.: 375–82)—a testament to the fact that the hero of cyberpunk is first and foremost he who more or less successfully flees capture by the powers of this inhuman future, the action of which moreover constantly camouflages as human, all too human forms: “Nation-states, [...] Remember them?” (Gibson 2000: 195). As an example of an empirical object, embodying the transcendental condition of this flight, we can take the bridge connecting parts of Gibson’s trilogy together—not just as a location where the action unfolds, but as some sort of collective fetish which deactivates the consequences of the conspiracy of the future and the past, snatching living space and time from the apparatuses of capture (Gibson’s “dystopia” holds out a hand to Fourier’s

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fer, the entire society will attempt to divert you: have you had some failure in love, have you been turned down, the Bacchantes, Adventuresses, and other pleasure corporations will surround you and lead you off, instantly efface the harm that has befallen you” (Barthes 1989: 82).

“utopia,” whose phalanstery is a true desiring machine, capable of killing the senseless enthusiasm of the “civilized”); let us quote the description of this “thomasson,”<sup>24</sup> executed by the book, according to the cyberpunk poetics of enumeration:

“[The bridge’s] steel bones, its stranded tendons, were lost within an accretion of dreams: tattoo parlors, gaming arcades, dimly lit stalls stacked with decaying magazines, sellers of fireworks, of cut bait, betting shops, sushi bars, unlicensed pawnbrokers, herbalists, barbers, bars. Dreams of commerce, their locations generally corresponding with the decks that had once carried vehicular traffic; while above them, rising to the very peaks of the cable towers, lifted the intricately suspended barrio, with its unnumbered population and its zones of more private fantasy.” (Gibson 1994: 70)

## Conclusion

The goal of writing *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* was to show how, in contemporary times, an economy (both political and psychic) free from fixation on the lack is possible. A forerunner of Marxism and the marginalism that followed it, Fourierism appealed to Deleuze and Guattari precisely in this context. Through a modification of marginalist logic, we were able to show how desire constitutes an “apparatus of capture,” how simultaneously inside and outside a certain initial territorial assemblage the idea of its despotic recoding is formed, which will later ground the logic of capitalist axiomatization, breaking traditional codes and, through enveloping and reterritorialization, creating an immanent despotism of the business enterprise as a universal form of life. On the inner limit of its development, what Deleuze calls *society of control* appears.

This comes out well in the matter of wages: the factory was a body of men whose internal forces reached an equilibrium between the highest possible production and the lowest possible wages; but in a control society businesses take over from factories, and a business is a soul, a gas. There were of course bonus systems in factories, but businesses

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<sup>24</sup> “Thomasson was an American baseball player, very handsome, very powerful. He went to the Yomiyuri Giants in 1981, for a large sum of money. Then it was discovered that he could not hit the ball. The writer and artisan Gempei Akasegawa appropriated his name to describe certain useless and inexplicable monuments, pointless yet curiously art-like features of the urban landscape. But the term has subsequently taken on other shades of meaning. If you wish, I can access and translate today’s definitions in our Gendai Yogo Kisochohshiki, that is, The Basic Knowledge of Modern Terms” (Gibson 1994: 72).

strive to introduce a deeper level of modulation into all wages, bringing them into a state of constant metastability punctuated by ludicrous challenges, competitions, and seminars. (Deleuze 1995: 179)

“Businesses strive to introduce a deeper level”: But what is this territory or assemblage, which exceeds the limits of the factory’s territory—but also those of all other territories—constituted within the framework of the disciplinary paradigm? It is Fourier, with his exceptionally joyful and simultaneously majestic delirium, who is the first to create the map of this territory—a map from which all the following marketing specialists and effective managers will make their copies. “Can one already glimpse the outlines of these future forms of resistance, capable of standing up to marketing’s blandishments?” (Deleuze 1995: 182). With this question, Deleuze concludes his “Postscript on Control Societies.” Fourier’s discourse, ever leaning toward dissolving in the poetics of enumeration, has as its object desire, the power of which is incommensurate with any axiomatically defined system of measuring the efficiency of a business project (hence it must be constantly demonstrated, that under the state of Civilization—and we still, of course, exist within it—every production can be effective, only based on the apparatuses of anti-production,<sup>25</sup> or “negative production,” as Fourier calls it [1996: 161]). The state of harmony, implemented in the phalange, realizes itself in a form that transforms the calculation of profits into merely one of the possible side effects of an infinitely differentiated satisfaction, not subordinate to the imperative of pleasure. It is indeed sensible to relate this form to fetishism—not to the reproduction of some singular fetish, but rather to that which Deleuze and Guattari call a *miraculating fetishistic machine*, which takes the partial organ-objects from the subjugation to the totalizing authority of the organism and attaches them to the body without organs. There they enter “into the new syntheses of included disjunction and nomadic conjunction, of overlapping and permutation, on this body—syntheses that continue to repudiate the organism and its organization” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 326)—just like the bridge from Gibson’s trilogy, resisting the actions of the agents from “corporations of the future.” In truth, Deleuze and Guattari’s organism is Fourier’s

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<sup>25</sup> “What we have tried to show apropos of capitalism is how it inherited much from a transcendent death-carrying agency, the despotic signifier, but also how it brought about this agency’s effusion in the full immanence of its own system: the full body, having become that of capital-money, suppresses the distinction between production and anti-production; everywhere it mixes anti-production with the productive forces in the immanent reproduction of its own always widened limits (the axiomatic). [...] Absorbed, diffuse, immanent death is the condition formed by the signifier in capitalism, the empty locus that is everywhere displaced in order to block the schizophrenic escapes and place restraints on the flights” (Deleuze and Guattari: 1983: 335).



“civilization,” and if here we must speak of a schizoanalytical modification of Fourierism, it consists in pointing to a synchronous rather than diachronous character of the relation between Civilization and Harmony, organism and body without organs, the molecular and the molar. However, Fourier himself supposes that the “vicious passions” of the civilized—ambition, striving to get rich, gluttony—will not disappear in the state of the future, but will be precisely transformed, inscribed into another kind of assemblage.

*Translated from the Russian by Diana Khamis*

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