Michaela Wünsch
University of Vienna

Art, Politics, and Truth in Heidegger’s Anti-Semitism

Abstract
This article discusses the relation between art and politics by reference to Martin Heidegger’s essay on the “Origin of the Work of Art” (1971a). It argues that Heidegger’s Nazism and anti-Semitism are not situated in his remarks on politics, but in his concept of art and technology. Alongside a reading of ideas on art and his fear of modern technology the question arises if this anti-Semitism is crucial to Heidegger’s philosophy or if it is “banal” in the sense Jean-Luc Nancy recently argued: banal according to Hannah Arendt’s judgment of Eichmann (Nancy 2015: 12). Banality implies for Nancy a doxa of anti-Semitism that can be found not only in Heidegger’s Black Notebooks, but also in his concepts of history, technics, and modernity.

Keywords
anti-Semitism, discourse on art and politics, Heidegger, Nazism, techné
Art, Politics, and Truth in Heidegger’s Anti-Semitism

1. Art and Techné

Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe states that “it is not in the discourse of 1933 that ‘Heidegger’s politics’ is to be found” (1990: 53), namely in the Rectoral Address, but in his discourse on art and techné. Lacoue-Labarthe deduces from Heidegger’s 1945 testament that the essential reason for Heidegger’s commitment to the Nazis was poetry and the “hymning of what is German” (1990: 55) to which the Nazis seemed to open a horizon. Later the main reason for Heidegger to abandon the Nazis was again poetry, because it turns out that the Nazis “have had the least understanding [of this poetry]” (1990: 55), especially Hölderlin. Lacoue-Labarthe comments on this ongoing faith in poetry as follows:

Now the idea that the beginnings of a “Verwindung” of Nihilism are to be found in poetic thinking and in the hymning of what is “German” is something Heidegger never said in 1933. And yet, after his “withdrawal” this is, in fact, his most constant message. His unique motive [...] for this is as follows: There will be no salvation for Germany, i.e., no possibility of the Germans as people entering (Western/world) history and fulfilling then political-historical destiny, unless they listen to Hölderlin. [...] It is art that is conceived in the first place as harbouring within the capacity of opening up a possibility of historical Dasein (Lacoue-Labarthe 1990: 56).

The former remarks of Heidegger on German destiny are quite explicit, but explain only partly the role Heidegger sees in art’s historical role. The relation between art and (fascist) politics remains quite unclear, as well as the specific aesthetics that Lacoue-Labarthe calls “national-aestheticism’ that has supplanted political National Socialism” (1990: 53).

Lacoue-Labarthe situates national aestheticism in Heidegger’s aesthetic theory, based on the idea that art reveals the “physical” determination of the community, beginning with language (1990: 69). Lacoue-Labarthe proposes that three aspects of this idea are crucial. The first is that art is able to reveal some kind of truth or essence, the second is that what is revealed through techné is physis. Physis is revealed by techné and through techné physis deciphers and reveals itself. Lacoue-Labarthe translates techné as “knowledge.” For him, Heidegger’s discourse around techné “can enlighten us to the real, or profound nature of Nazism,” which is the essence of politics (1990: 53), insofar as techné is the political site of art in Heidegger’s writing.

Physis, which might be the “soil” Heidegger speaks about in his essay on artwork, is the source of Heidegger’s racism, although he neglected a biological racism or anti-Semitism (1990: 24). According to Lacoue-La-
Michaela Wünsch

barthe, Heidegger’s racism is situated somewhere else: “Racism—and anti-Semitism in particular—is primarily, fundamentally, an aestheticism. [...] This is why racism goes hand in hand [...] with a massive unleashing of techné, [...] which proceeds increasingly to conceal physis, whose limits it oversteps” (1990: 69). The third crucial aspect of Heidegger’s national aestheticism that has supplanted his Nazism after the “turn” is, for Lacoue-Labarthe, Heidegger’s idea of history. I will return to this point later.

The relation between art and physis is also a topic in Heidegger’s essay on the origin of artwork, especially in the first version of the essay. He describes truth as “erdahaft” (“soil-like”):

Because the work of art—and only it—throws the soil/earth as self-enclosed in the world designed for dispute, the artwork, which means art, is a matter of truth (Heidegger 2012: 98, own translation).

Art is even able to turn soil into homeland und to make a home for the people into the uncanniness of Being (Seyn):

The earth becomes only through work worldlike and therefore homeland [...] In the work of building and saying and constructing the There is being fought, the emerging and rooted middle, in which and out of which a people founds it’s historical dwelling—becoming home in Being to take the uncanniness of Being seriously (Heidegger 2012: 86, own translation).

While in his essay on the work of art Heidegger does not indicate which kind of people dwell historically, it became clear through the recent publication of his Black Notebooks (Schwarze Hefte, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c) that Jews represent the opposite of his ideal of art and its effects on home, history and Being.

If “Erdbverbundenheit” (earthboundedness) is the ground for “the truthful event” and a product of art as well as to opening up “historical dwelling” for “the people,” the lack of history, “Bodenlosigkeit” (bottomlessness) and “Weltlosigkeit” (worldlessness) are on the contrary associated with Jews who do not risk “Being,” according to Heidegger (2014b: 96ff.):

The victory of history over the non-historical can only take place, where the bottomless excludes itself, because it does not risk Being, but calculates with being and regard its calculations as the real (Heidegger 2014b: 96, own translation).

Calculative thinking is what characterize Jewry instead and “explains” their lack of “worldliness”:
Art, Politics, and Truth in Heidegger’s Anti-Semitism

One of the most hidden forms of the gigantic and perhaps the oldest is the tenacious aptitude for calculating and profiteering and interminning, upon which the worldlessness of Jewry is founded (Heidegger 2014b: 97, translation by Peter E. Gordon).

The aptitude for calculating or calculative thinking is also in part not so much of techné, but of (modern) technology, in which attributions are almost identical with those of the Jews who are the “antitype to the artisanal innocence of being-in-the-world” (Gordon 2014).

In his “Introduction into Metaphysics,” Heidegger writes about Russia and America: “the same hopeless frenzy of unchained technology and of the rootless organization of the average man” (Heidegger 2000: 40). In Being and Time, he writes that radio destroys “the everyday surrounding world” (Heidegger 1996: 98) and that television is “unsettling” (entsetzend) and will “soon pervade and dominate the whole mechanisms and drive of communication” (Heidegger 1971: 163). All these visions and anxieties of a bottomless raging of unleashed power of technology can be read as a general critique against modernity in most of Heidegger’s writings, but are associated with Jews in his notebooks. In regard to art and culture he attests that it is “Jewish acting” (jüdisches Gebahren) to “adopt culture” as an “instrument of power to dominate and pretend superiority” (Heidegger 2014b: 81). “Culture” in this context is only an instrument of politics, an instrument to veil “pleasures of power” (2014b: 79). Even Heidegger not only refers to Jews in his attack, the features he dismisses are the lack of history, world, and soil (physis) that results for him in the biggest danger: that art is not able to unconceal truth anymore, because technics as modern technology lost its original ability to reveal truth.

In his essay “The Question Concerning Technology,” Heidegger differentiates between Greek techné and modern technology:

Technology is a mode of revealing. Technology comes to presence in the realm where revealing (Entbergen) and unconcealment (Unverborgenheit) take place, where aletheia, truth, happens. In opposition to this definition of the essential domain of technology, one can object that it indeed holds for Greek thought and that at best it might apply to the techniques of handcraftsman, but that it simply does not fit modern machine-powered technology. And it is precisely the latter and it alone that is the disturbing thing, that moves us to ask the question concerning technology per se (Heidegger 1977: 13ff.).

Here we have again the “artisanal innocence” Peter Gordon mentions as the opposite of the “disturbing thing” of modern technology, associated with Jewry. Or, as Lacoue-Labarthe points out, one can find here an ideology “systematically organizing itself on the basis of values, themes and motifs [...] of the closed peasant or artisan economy (shepherds and
Michaela Wünsch
carpenters), of the ‘homeland,’ of the ‘native land,’ of the ‘familiar’ [...] Turning, consequently, into the slightly biting, reactive and reactionary protestation against the entirety of modernity” (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 1997a: 60).

Samuel Weber stresses in his reading of Heidegger’s essay not so much the difference between traditional, innocent techniques of the peasant on the one side and modern technology on the other, but more the process that one pre-established order has been replaced by another order, which includes not only a new form of ordering, but also a movement of unsecuring, “for it must not be forgotten that the goings-on of modern technics, emplacement, remain above all a way of unsecuring” (Weber 1989: 985). It is therefore that he proposes to translate “Entber-gung” not as revealing, but as unsecuring.

Weber applies this “unsecuring” especially on Heidegger’s notion of modern technics (technology), the change of (technological) orders that reveals the “unsecuring tendency of technics as such” (1989: 987). This interpretation not only questions the domination of modern technology that Heidegger fears, but points out its unsecuring effects, which he maybe fears even more. On first sight, Heidegger relates unrevealing (Entber-gen, that Webers translates as unsecuring) to securing: “Regulating and securing even become the chief characteristics of the challenging revealing” (Heidegger 1977: 7). Securing means here that modern technology challenges natures to secure its resources: “The revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging, which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored as such” (1977: 6).

Lacoue-Labarthe comments on this paragraph as follows:

In effect, through a general mutation affecting the “causal” domain (the domain of “responsibility” or “efficiency”), this modification of unconcealment, this metamorphosis of producing into provoking is a transformation of Bestellen. It is a transformation of “culture” if, as Heidegger insists, this is the oldest meaning of the word. For the appropriating and appropriated work of the peasant who cultivated in the sense of “to take care of” and “to maintain” [...] an entirely different mode of Bestellen—of in-stalling, let us say—is substituted. This latter is essentially a Stellen, a claiming (a commanding, a committing, a summoning, a challenging), in the sense, this time, of both provoking and extracting (ausför dern) (Lacoue-Labarthe 1998: 67).

The unconcealment by the mode of “Bestellen,” “a sense of Being as stance, stature, station-as, in Greek, ‘stasis or stele’” (1998: 68) is for Lacoue-Labarthe a command that sets something in a fixed static place, even he deconstructs this stabilizing reading later in his text and stress more the “provoking” part of Bestellen (ordering). Because, while the re-
vealing of modern technology secures energy, it also entails a danger of unsecuring. The danger lies that this kind of revealing is not “original” anymore and denies the “call of a more primal truth” (Weber 1989: 14). These are the “unsecuring” effects of modern technology and the reason why Weber translates “entbergen” as unsecuring.

The relation between technics and physis turned out less secure in Weber’s interpretation than in Lacoue-Labarthe’s. For Weber, techné is not revealing or “imitating” physis, what is brought-forth as techné has its opening up “in another, in the craftsman or artist” (Heidegger 1977: 10). It is indeed that Heidegger values physis as a higher form of poesis because of its immanence. But Weber stresses that things are never simple with Heidegger and therefore on the other hand the innermost principle of nature is indeed to open itself up to alterity: “In this sense one could almost suspect that the ‘truth’ of physis is nothing other than techné, [...] which emerges as more natural than nature itself” (Weber 1989: 986).

Lacoue-Labarthe on the contrary reads in the “Origin of the Work of Art” that physis and techné share the same origin, because techné is not representational in a secondary sense, but makes physis present mimetically. There is no difference or deferral.1 This non-difference is for Lacoue-Labarthe at the heart of a non-differenciation of the political and the aesthetical in Heidegger (and Nazism), in the aestheticization of politics, what he calls national aestheticism.

Lacoue-Labarthe as well as Jean-Luc Nancy accuses Heidegger of having an organic conception of the political that includes an application of a mimetic concept of art on people.

Lyotard also points out the mimetic character of Heidegger’s concept of art, “which supplements nature by imitating it” (Lyotard 1990: 76), a similar point was made by Weber. But Weber stresses the relation between techné and knowledge:

Techné is always associated by Heidegger with another Greek word, epistêmè. [...] Thus, the knowledge that is technics is not addressed at making or producing particular things, but rather at the “unlocking of beings as such.” In this sense, techné is a form of poiesis that in turn is closely related to art (Weber 1989: 980).

Similar to Weber, Lacoue-Labarthe detects a displacement in this form of poiesis: “Poiesis is at least ‘ambivalent’—not only because it holds within it both art and technology (in their modern difference). It is also ‘ambivalent’ because... in spite of appearances it ‘reveals’ physis itself”
Michaela Wünsch

(Lacoe-Labarthe 1998: 82), instead of revealing the appearance of truth.

The knowledge connected to art and poesis is for Heidegger a mimetic one as we can see in the "Origin of the Work of Art": "The word techné denotes rather a mode of knowing. To know means to have seen, in the widest sense of seeing, which means to apprehend what is present, as such" (Heidegger 1971a: 57). "As such" means that we "come to know the equipmental character specifically through the work itself also holds of the thingly character of the thing (1971a: 67).

Techné is the way we came to know about the essence of things and equipment (Zeug) in art. This mimetic character is what Nancy criticizes as immanentism: "Consequently, economic ties, technological operations, and political fusion (into a body or under a leader) represent or rather present, expose, and realize this essence necessarily in themselves. Essence is set to work in them; through them, it becomes its own work. This is what we have called 'totalitarianism,' but it might be better named 'immanentism', [...]" (Nancy 1991: 3). In another context Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe discuss the mimicry of the Greeks as specific for German Nazism (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 1997b: 174), which results in an "intermingling of politics and art, the production of the political as art [...] the construction, modeling (Bildung) and production of the German people through and as artwork" (1997b: 179).

Jacques Derrida also criticized Heidegger’s Greco-German axis in regard to Heidegger’s assumption that only the German and Greek language are able “of naming, of calling up Being—or, rather, of hearing itself called by Being” (Derrida 1989: 69). “The joint privilege of German and Greek” is not reduced to the political as art, but, as Heidegger says “a bit naively,” includes thinking and spirit.

2. Art, Truth and Ideology

If techné is the way to get to know the truth unconcealed in art, which kind of truth can be found in art? And why is this truth not accessible to “Jewish” calculative thinking and how might it be otherwise connected to Nazism? Where in this relation between art, techné, and physis is Heidegger’s Nazism revealed?

Derrida criticizes Heidegger’s concept of truth in relation to art in his The Truth in Painting (1987). In this book Derrida replies to Meyer Schapiro’s critique of Heidegger’s interpretation of Van Gogh’s painting of peasant shoes. For Derrida it is not suffice “to analyze the motivations of all sorts, metaphysical, ideological, political, ideophantasmatic, which drove Heidegger in 1935 to annex these shoes, on the pretext of repatriating them back to their authentic rural landscape, back to their native place” (Derrida 1987: 393). Of course he also questions Heidegger’s search and desire for earth, the rural, soil, and experience of origin, which can be
called an ideological projection on these shoes. But the problem lies for Derrida more in the alleged interdeterminacy of the picture that Heidegger claims, and the attribution he gives the shoes as internal, an inner truth of the painting.

Worse than this annexion of the shoes in the name of ideology of earth and origin, or equipment is for Derrida Heidegger’s concept of aletheia in this context:

Van Gogh’s painting is the disclosure of what the product, the pair of peasant shoes, is in truth [...] This being comes into unconcealedness (Unverborgenheit) of its Being. The Greeks called this unconcealing of being aletheia. —Isn’t that the worst of all? [...] Here the painting now unveils by speaking, in the immediate proximity of its presence, which it would be enough to place oneself or find oneself in front of (Derrida 1987: 324).

Derrida criticizes the fact that Heidegger uses the assumed uselessness and lack of context of the painted shoes to take them as an example for the truth in art as useless (interesselos), to use them for his own claims, to exploit the painting as an example for the usefulness of being-product of product (Zeug-Sein des Zeugs): “We will now exploit the surplus value of the out-of-service. It is in the uselessness—of the shoes that we will ‘read’ the usefulness of the product, the being-product of the product as usefulness. [...] In uselessness the truth of the useful appears” (1987: 359).

In fact, Heidegger is not so much interested in painting, but in poetry. “Art, as the setting-into-work of truth, is poetry. [...] The nature (Wesen) of art is poetry. The nature of poetry, in turn, is the founding of truth” (Heidegger 1971a: 72). But the truth of art is not available to everyone, but “thrown toward the coming preservers, that is, toward an historical group of men” (1971a: 73). This group does not include Jewish people, as we have learned before. The thrown art is an opening toward earth: “Genuinely poetic projection is the opening up or disclosure of that into which human being (Dasein) as historical already cast (schon geworfen ist). This is the earth and, for an historical people, its earth, the self-closing ground on which it rests together with everything that already is, through still hidden from itself. It is however, its world, which prevails in virtue of the relation of human being (Dasein) to the unconcealedness of Being” (1971: 73). Through art being (Seiendes) has to come in contact with Being (Sein). Heidegger mentions that being (Seiendes) has become in modern age “objects that could be controlled and seen through calculation” (1971: 74). This is not art, art happens whenever there is a beginning, when history begins. “History is the transporting of a people into its appointed task as entrance into that people’s endowment” (1971: 74) This destination of history is especially reserved for the Germans and not for Jewish Germans, who don’t have a beginning, as Luca di Blasi has pointed out
At the end of his essay Heidegger asks in regard of the word “origin” in the title of the essay, if art can be origin, if it leads to the people’s historical existence, and it depends if the Germans will be able to withstand Hölderlin’s work (2014: 76). “The now ‘biggest German’ stands for the contemplation and return to the very first beginning before the first beginning of the pre-socratical Greeks” (2014: 293, own translation), and gives access to the origin of historical being. Nancy also criticizes Heidegger’s concepts of the beginning, even Heidegger was able to make a break with a teleological idea of history (Nancy 2015: 35). But at the same time, Heidegger was not able to analyze the event of anti-Semitism in history. On the contrary he was even so banal to refer (indirectly) to the simplest stereotypes from the *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. Actually, Nancy detects a direct link between the idea of beginning and the banality of his anti-Semitism: “The fact that Heidegger picks up the banality of anti-Semitism means that he kept clear a crucial element of metaphysics of Being: the precondition of the initial, the ground and origin, the authentic and the proper” (2015: 41, own translation). For Nancy the task consists in separating the question of ontological difference from the dispositive of the origin and this task is identical with the duty to question the self and (Christian) self-hatred (2015: 41).

It is obvious that Heidegger’s concept of art as political ground for the historical existence of the Germans is based on everything the Jews don’t have in his opinion: earth, beginning, or history. But beside all these obvious ideological implications, I am in addition interested in what Derrida called “the worst,” the Greek (of course!) term *aletheia*, the unconcealment of what is still hidden from the German people.

But what is unconcealed must have been concealed before. Concealment “prevails in the midst of beings in a twofold way”: it can be a refusal and a dissembling, that a being appears, but presents itself as other than it is. “This denial, in the form of a double concealment, belongs to the nature of truth as unconcealedness” (Heidegger 1971a: 53).

One can analyze this concept of truth as unconcealness in two ways. One would be that Heidegger fell into an ideological trap because he followed the idea that a veil hides a true kernel. The other interpretation would be that Heidegger was close to Jewish thinking in his assumption that truth requires and depends on untruth. In the first interpretation we would follow Žižek when he argues that Heidegger was caught in a ideological trap: “He [Heidegger] repeats the elementary ideological gesture of maintaining an inner distance toward the ideological text—of claiming that there is something more beneath it, a non-ideological kernel: ideology exerts its hold over us by means of this very insistence that the Cause we adhere to is not ‘merely’ ideological” (Žižek 2000: 14). For Žižek, Heidegger had already made the same mistake, repeated by later Heideggerians who are “in search of a positive, ontic political system that would come closest to the epochal ontological truth” (2000: 13).
And Heidegger already made this mistake that even he was the very philosopher “who focused his interest on the enigma of ontological difference—who warned again and again against the metaphysical mistake of conferring ontological dignity on some ontic content...,” and “fell into the trap of conferring on Nazism the ontological dignity of suiting the essence of modern man” which “lies in the encounter between modern men and technology” (2000: 13).

I would argue that Heidegger’s concept of aletheia is ideological not only in the obvious political sense that only the Germans have access to the concealed inner truth of historical Being via art, while the German Jews have not, but in the sense the there is a concealed truth that is hidden, a non-ideological kernel. Heidegger did not recognize the constitutive gap separating the direct ideological legitimization of a movement from its inner greatness. To use the terms of later Heidegger, “ontological insight necessarily entails ontic blindness and error, one must disregard the ontological horizon of one’s activity” (2000: 15).

But there is another reason to doubt that Heidegger only assumed a true kernel behind the Nazi ideology and didn’t support that ideology itself. Luca di Blasi questions the widespread assumption that Heidegger refused the racist ideology of the Nazis. In his Black Notebooks one finds an enigmatic note (and for di Blasi it is the central passage regarding the question after Heidegger’s anti-Semitism) about race. He writes that “the Jews with their calculative gift ‘live’ the longest time after the principle of race, this is the reason why they fight it’s implementation the most. The implementation of racial selection doesn’t emanate from life itself, but from the empowerment of life through the machinations” (Heidegger 2014c: 56, own translation).

Heidegger’s line of argument is that the Nazis only overtook the idea of the race principle from the Jewish “machination” and this is why he criticized the racial politics of the Nazis. In addition, he argues that the Jews even lost the principle of race, that they are “disraced” (entrasst) as the quote from the Black Notebooks continues:

…it is a disracement (Entrassung) of the peoples through a restraining of them in the uniform and homogenous construction of all being. With the disracement of the peoples comes a self-alienation—the loss of history—the fields of decision of be-ing (Seyn) (Heidegger 2014c: 56, own translation).

Di Blasi concludes that Heidegger didn’t distance himself from a biologist racism, but excludes the “disraced” Jews from the status of race. He calls this “metaracism,” which means that for Heidegger the “overcoming of race didn’t count positively as liberation, but negatively as disjunction from a racial “thrownness” which he associates especially with and against Jews” (di Blasi 2014: 293).
This argument coincides with the distinction of a truthful kernel and wrong appearance. The race principle, which the Jews followed according to Heidegger, is not the “real” definition of race, but a part of their global network (“World Jewry”). The Nazis made the mistake to adapt this false idea of racism, while they distanced themselves from a more truthful “Blut und Boden (blood and soil)” concept of race, in which the superior race is well connected to earth and its own history and is best represented by Hölderlin’s poetry.

Conclusion

Reiner Schürmann stresses that truth is not only unconcealed in art but also in Heidegger’s notion of politics. He refers to Heidegger’s quote: “One essential way in which truth establishes itself in the entities that is has opened up it truth setting itself into work. Another way in which truth comes to presence is the deed that founds a political state” (Heidegger 1971a: 60). Schürmann comments: “The lines quoted above give testimony to the encompassing essence of aletheia. Whether truth comes about in an artwork or in a political deed, these are but modalities in which it orders itself for a while in a given area” (Schürmann 1990: 34). And it is enframing (Gestell) which orders thinking, artistic creation, and the terms in which political issues are raised and solved (1990: 34). Like Weber, Schürmann stresses the “technological danger,” and he analyzes as Weber that danger for Heidegger lies not so much in the global domination of modern technology, but in the obfuscation of epoch. “The danger is the epoch, the epochè, the withholding or oblivion of presencing, its obfuscation by the principles. Such obfuscation, hence such danger, is ancient. However, it reaches its greatest opacity in the technological age” (1990: 35).

Nazism represented for Heidegger the inner truth of an epoch, its greatness, because it has culminated in the greatest danger of the epoch. Schürmann argues that the political is the domain in which the fixed order reveals itself, while the epochal underside of history is shifting. It is in this hidden layer that the displacement of order occur” (1990: 37). For Schürmann, topology and place, or rather the displacement of orders is central to understand the dangers of technology. Heidegger locates the political as the site of public conjunction and interaction of things, words, and deeds. An epoch is reduced to the way words, things, and actions are mutually present, it is constructed out of the difference between present entities and their presencing, but it is deconstructed to let presencing become accessible to our inquiry (1990: 81). “The arena

---

2 For Karl Löwith, Heidegger’s historicity culminated in the assumption that Nation Socialism represented the “inner truth” of the epoch (Löwith 1942).
where an epochal constellation most obviously displays its principle is the political” (1990: 36). From this perspective art would be political only if it is located in the public and if it displays the principles of the epochal constellation.

If we follow Nancy in the idea that Heidegger was not able to analyze and historicize anti-Semitism, the reason for this blindness is that Heidegger’s Nazism and anti-Semitism was not located in the political but in art and techné and therefore did not display its principles, Heidegger just followed these principles without questioning them. He was looking for the inner truth of the epoch in art and aesthetics. When he recognized that the Nazis were not able to value and understand German poetry, he turned away from Nazism, but not from anti-Semitism, because for Heidegger Jews have never been able to participate in the greatness of German history, poetry, and art from the beginning.

Bibliography


Michaela Wünsch


